Independent Monitoring

(Campaign for Labor Rights n. 13, April-May 1998)

by Tim Connor, coordinator of the Nike Watch Campaign of Community Aid Abroad (in Australia) . The author submitted this piece as an individual. The views expressed here do not necessarily represent the position of Community Aid Abroad.

Independent monitoring is the subject of several discussions taking place around the World, including discussion wlithin the Apparel Industry Partnership in the United States and groups involved in the Clean Clothes Campaign in Europe. A model for independent monitoring is emerging from these discussions. According to this model, the organisation responsible for accrediting monitors would be made up of representatives from industry, unions and non­governmental organizations (NGOs). If such a system is adopted, the following elements would be crucial if the monitoring system is to be effective:

The NGO and union representatives on the board of the accrediting organisation should have a majority of votes, and not a 50:50 division with industry representatives.

Companies being monitored should not be able to collectively veto action by the very organisation set up to monitor thcm.

The accrediting organisation should be responsible for selecting who would audit which company as well as for determining accreditation. Monitors should be directly account.lhtt en the accrediting organisation Other than to the company they arc monitoring. li companies themselves make the sclection, they will be tempted to select contractors which do "just enough" to be accredited. Over a period of time, inspectors with a commitment to highly rigorous monitoring would either drop out of the market or temper their commitment in order to get work from companies. The fact that monitors 4 need to he accredited would not be adequate to keep standards of monitoring up. It would be very difficult for groups involved in accreditation to get a full picture of how rigorous an inspector is being, and once inspectors who have taken a rigorous approach to their work have dropped out of the market (because no company will employ them), there would be pressure on the accrediting Organization to continue accrediting the remaining inspectors so that the system remains viable (i.e., with an adequate number of inspectors). An inspector's accreditation would thus not be removed except in extreme cases and inspectors would be given too much leeway for lax reporting, if that is even discovered.

The accrediting organisation should include strong representation by unions and NGOs from the "South."

In the selection of auditors, preference should be given to local, non profit NGOs over forwprofit organisations (provided that the accrediting organisation believes that the non profit NGO is able to perform the task).

Workers' representatives should be involved in the monitoring process. In countries where independent unions are able to function, this would mean at the least that such unions would be able easily, affordably and without the company's knowledge S to make complaints directly to the monitor of the factory in question. If they were not satisfied that the monitoring organisation had investigated the complaint properly they should easily and aftordably be able to make a complaint about this to the accrediting organisation. Union representatives making these complaints should be protected from any possible reprisals. Where an independent union is not able to organise, workers' representatives (elected by workers by secret ballot in elections monitored by an independent body) should have similar rights and protections.

Interviews of workers should be anonymous (workers' names not recorded), should take place away from the factory and without the knowledge of factory supervisors or management and should be conducted either by, or in the presence of, organisations or individuals which the worker trusts (e.g., trusted local N(SOs or local individuals of high standing in the community such a village elders).

Where it is found that a contractor is not complying with the code, they should be given a period of time (say 6 months) to correct the identified problems and, if they fail to do so, the report should be made public. Even if they do come into compliance, however, they should be much more closely monitored for the next couple of years, and during that period should not be given leeway to correct problems without the media finding out (i.e., contractors should not be able to let standards lapse again on the basis that they have to fix problems only if a monitor discovers them and that even if such a discovery is made, there will be plenty of time to fix the problem).

The companies involved should pay for monitoring. Still, NGOs need to consider cost when advocating a system of monitoring. Some companies use the services of hundreds of contractors. How often should monitoring be conducted? A possible measure might be that if a contractor expected that ir was likely that it would he monitored in ally given year, that would he regarded as adequate. All monitoring, however, should not be geared to the most difficult cases. That is, while it may be too expensive to inspect every tiny subcontractor every year, it does make sense to at the very least require annual social audits of factories with thousands of employees. )

It is important that an effective and representative organisation be established which would accredit and select monitors for Nike and other companies over the long term. This is likely to be much more constructive than short term ad hot arrangements based on the appointment of individual NGOs to monitor individual companies. As such we are keenly interested in developments such as the Apparel Industry Partnership in the U.S. and the Ethical Trading Initiative in the UK. The Apparel Industry Partnership is yet to agree on a monitoring system, brat they have consulted widely for ideas about what people regarded as the elements of an effective system. Our fingers are crossed that the monitoring system they institute will be onc which will effectively keeE tabs on companies who join the partnership.


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